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Essay
Burying Evidence’s Dead Hand
Matthew D. Provencher*
ABSTRACT

When the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence were adopted, they
displaced all inconsistent case law existing at the time. Though the
Rules retain a great deal of the evidence practice that preceded them,
there is much in evidence practice that changed with their adoption.
Rhode Island courts have consistently applied Rule 403 in a manner
that comports with practice as it existed before the enactment of the
Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. That practice, though, is
inconsistent with the plain language of the Rule. These doctrines
must be discarded.
INTRODUCTION

Law reform is a hard business. It took more than a century for
American pleading and practice to complete codification efforts
begun by David Dudley Field, II, in the mid-nineteenth century. 1
Evidence reform proceeded along similar paths, but took even
longer at both the state and federal levels.2 Rhode Island’s work,
as we will see, remains incomplete. What happens when old
* Matthew D. Provencher is a 2015 graduate of Roger Williams
University School of Law, and an attorney in private practice in Providence,
Rhode Island. The views expressed here are the author’s alone.
1. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 1002 at 9–17 (4th ed. 2015).
2. See generally Eleanor Swift, One Hundred Years of Evidence Law
Reform: Thayer’s Triumph, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2437 (2000).
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precedents survive the adoption of a new code? The hand of the
past pushes the law in directions opposite to those intended by
reforming jurisdictions. And in Rhode Island, that dead hand has
pushed courts into misstating the law of one particular rule of
evidence. Rule 403 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence is
consistently applied by courts in a way that typifies the ad hoc and
case-specific evidentiary rulings of the past, a pattern at odds with
the purpose of codified evidentiary rules. The application of these
doctrines is an error of law that the bench and bar should put a stop
to.
THE BACKGROUND OF CODIFICATION EFFORTS

Rhode Island codified its evidence law a little over a decade
after the United States Congress did the same for federal courts. 3
The Supreme Court of the United States originally sought to
promulgate federal rules of evidence under the power granted to it
by the Rules Enabling Act. 4 That statute, which created the unified
federal procedural structure we now take for granted, eliminated
the cumbersome process dictated by the Conformity Act of 1872 and
marks the point at which modern practice began to take shape. 5
Rhode Island had its own mid-century law reform movement
that paralleled federal efforts. First, in 1966, Rhode Island practice
underwent a revolution similar to the one caused by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure when the adoption of the Rhode Island
Rules of Civil Procedure. 6 Shortly after this procedural reform was
accomplished, the Supreme Court of the United States shifted its
focus to evidence reform, and sought to complete its codification
efforts in 1972. 7
In the heady atmosphere of the Watergate scandal, though,
Congress was unwilling to let the Supreme Court effect wholesale
changes to evidence without the opportunity for input, specifically

3. The Rhode Island Supreme Court created the Rhode Island Rules of
Evidence on July 23, 1987, twelve years after Congress enacted the Federal
Rules of Evidence in 1975. See Order, In re Rhode Island Rules of Evidence,
No. 0915e (R.I. July 23, 1987). The General Assembly later passed a law
codifying the Rules of Evidence. See 9 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19-42 (2012).
4. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–77 (2012).
5. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, at 9–12.
6. Robert B. Kent, Rhode Island Interest: Rhode Island Civil Procedure—
Some Problems, 9 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 429, 429 n.2 (2004).
7. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 8 n.7 (1996).
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Following
regarding the issue of evidentiary privileges. 8
procedures set forth in the Rules Enabling Act, Congress passed a
law staying the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and then
revised and passed the Rules as legislation, which was ultimately
signed into law by President Gerald Ford. 9
Not long after, Rhode Island embarked on its own evidence
reforms. The Rhode Island Supreme Court convened an advisory
committee in 1980, the work of which led to the final adoption of
the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence in 1987. 10 Though the Rhode
Island General Assembly passed an enabling act empowering civil
procedure reform, the creation of the Rules of Evidence would take
a different path. 11 Rather than promulgating the Rules of Evidence
through powers conferred by an enabling act, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court promulgated its Rules of Evidence through the
general power conferred upon it by the General Assembly and
through the Supreme Court’s inherent constitutional and
supervisory powers. 12
Though the General Assembly did not seize control of evidence
codification in the way Congress did, it played its own part. It
sought to legislatively enshrine the conclusion that the new rules of
evidence wholly displaced previous practice, wherever and
whenever they might be inconsistent: “The rules of evidence as
adopted by the Rhode Island [S]upreme [C]ourt shall be controlling
and take precedence over any statutory or case law in effect at the
time of the adoption that is inconsistent with the Rhode Island rules
of evidence.” 13 This language mirrors a provision of the federal
Rules Enabling Act.14
And yet, case law inconsistent with the Rules of Evidence
continues to hold precedential value in Rhode Island courts today.
8. To understand why evidentiary privileges were of particular interest
to Congress at that exact moment, see United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,
703–16 (1974).
9. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 935 n.9 (1983).
10. ERIC D. GREEN & ROBERT G. FLANDERS, JR., RHODE ISLAND EVIDENCE
MANUAL xxv (2005) [hereinafter RHODE ISLAND EVIDENCE MANUAL].
11. See 8 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-6-2(a) (2008).
12. Order, In re Rhode Island Rules of Evidence, No. 0915e (R.I. July 23,
1987).
13. Id.
14. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (“All laws in conflict with [the federal rules of
procedure and evidence] shall be of no further force or effect after such rules
have taken effect.”).
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Rule 403 is widely recognized as a critical component of evidence
law, one so important that it cuts across all other rules of
evidence. 15 By its own familiar terms, Rule 403 requires the
exclusion of evidence that, though of some probative value, finds
that value substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice which would inure to a party by its admission. 16
The goal of codification was to create a uniform, predictable,
accessible, consistent, and rational statement of the law.17 The
product of the advisory committee’s efforts to meet those goals led
to the text of the rule. Rule 403 is a general rule; it does not contain
a list of exemplar scenarios, such as the exceptions to hearsay, 18
nor does it apply to only a narrow category of evidence. 19 It is
intended to be applied in the same manner across all
circumstances. But it is undercut in two ways that sap its vitality
in cases where it is most closely at issue.
RULE 403 AND CRIME SCENE PHOTOGRAPHY

The application of Rhode Island’s Rule 403 is modified in one
particular context: crime scene photography.
Crime scene
photographs or video, especially those of murder victims or the
victims of other violent crimes, have their own rules for admission.
Rhode Island courts apply two tests when evaluating the
admissibility of crime scene photographs.20 First, “with respect to
highly prejudicial crime-scene photographs or pictures of murder
victims, [the Rhode Island Supreme] Court has consistently held
that ‘when such evidence is probative, the trial court’s admission of
explicit photographs is not an abuse of discretion and will not be
disturbed on appeal.’” 21 These holdings are not the result of general
15. State v. Gaspar, 982 A.2d 140, 147–48 (R.I. 2009).
16. R.I. R. EVID. 403.
17. See RHODE ISLAND EVIDENCE MANUAL, supra note 10, at xxvii–xxviii
(discussing codification objectives and inconsistent nature of evidence rulings
prior to adoption of rules).
18. See R.I. R. EVID. 803, 804.
19. See, e.g., R.I. R. EVID. 404(b), 609.
20. See, e.g., State v. Patel, 949 A.2d 401, 412–13 (R.I. 2008); State v.
O’Brien, 774 A.2d 89, 107 (R.I. 2001). “It is only evidence that is marginally
relevant and enormously prejudicial that must be excluded. Because ‘the
ultimate determination of the effect of evidence lies in the discretion of the trial
justice,’ we will not disturb such a determination on appeal absent an abuse of
discretion.” Patel, 949 A.2d at 412–13 (internal citations omitted).
21. O’Brien, 774 A.2d at 107 (quoting Hughes v. State, 656 A.2d 971, 972
(R.I. 1995)).
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or waived objections; the Court has applied these doctrines to direct
challenges under Rule 403. 22 Second, when confronted with crime
scene photographs, Rhode Island law requires an inquiry into the
proponent’s purpose for offering the evidence: “‘Indeed, only when
such evidence is offered solely to inflame the passions of the jury
should a photograph’ or other visual images of a crime victim be
excluded.” 23
These two doctrines conflict with Rule 403 in several ways. For
starters, there is no balancing under either standard. The relative
weights of probative value and unfair prejudice are never assessed,
nor compared against each other. The first test essentially reduces
a two-step balancing test to a one-step inquiry: does the photograph
or video have probative value? If it does, then the evidence is
admissible.24 Balancing does not appear to be necessary at all; so
long as there is probative value, a trial judge’s decision to admit the
evidence cannot be wrong. 25
The second test departs from examining the evidence on its
own merits entirely.
This intent-focused inquiry bears no
resemblance to the careful balancing and weighing that Rule 403
calls for. Instead, a trial judge must look at the evidence and try to
divine the mind of the evidence’s proponent, asking whether they
offer the evidence for the sole purpose of unduly influencing the
jury. 26 This second test effectively turns an evidentiary issue into
a Batson challenge in miniature.27 It shifts the reviewing court’s
focus from the evidence to the proponent; it asks about intent,
rather than the balance between probative value and unfair
prejudice; it requires a judge to scry the motives in a lawyer’s heart
rather than assess evidence.

22. See State v. Garcia, 140 A.3d 133, 144–45 (R.I. 2016); see also O’Brien,
774 A.2d at 106–07.
23. O’Brien, 774 A.2d at 107 (emphasis in original).
24. Hughes, 656 A.2d at 972.
25. See State v. Fry, 130 A.3d 812, 830 (R.I. 2016) (discussing trial judge’s
findings of probative value without mention of possible unfair prejudice); see
also id. at 832 (Flaherty, J., dissenting) (“It does not appear from the record
that the trial justice articulated, either expressly or impliedly, the balancing
test required by Rule 403.”).
26. O’Brien, 774 A.2d at 107.
27. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96–98 (1986) (establishing the
test to examine peremptory challenges of jurors for discriminatory intent).
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THE DOCTRINAL ORIGINS OF THE RULE

These special tests for crime scene photographs and videos are
an anomaly. It does not appear that any other types of evidence
have unique, case-made rules that contravene the Rhode Island
Rules of Evidence. Nor do any other categories of evidence have
extratextual tests that modify the application of relevant Rules of
Evidence by omitting part of the text, which happens here with the
elision of the balancing half of the Rule 403 test. Nor does it appear
that judicial evaluation of any other evidentiary issue necessitates
inquiry into the mental state or motive of the proponent of the
evidence. Why, exactly, does this one narrow species of evidence
have such an individualized rule?
There appear to be two independent sources, which have been
synthesized in modern decisions into the full rule. The first line of
cases, which created the substance of the rule in which crime scene
photographs or videos are only assessed for relevance and probative
value, not potential for unfair prejudice, appears to trace back
nearly a century in Rhode Island case law.28 By 1971 the rule was
well settled in a form easily recognizable to modern practitioners:
“[W]here a photograph constitutes competent evidence and
reasonably tends to prove or disprove some material facts in issue,
it is admissible in evidence even though it may have an influence
beyond the strict limits of the purpose for which it was admitted.”29
The rule is applied in essence the same today. 30
The second half of the equation, the “sole purpose” language,
appears to have its origins in a case decided about twenty years
before the adoption of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. State v.
Winston involved, as many crime scene photograph cases do, a
particularly gruesome and terrible crime. 31 Police responded to a
home in southern Providence at 1:38 a.m. on Christmas morning;
inside, they found the body of a two and one-half year-old girl.32
She had been stabbed, and there was visible evidence of a sexual
28. See State v. Greene, 60 A.2d 711, 715 (R.I. 1948); see also State v.
Miller, 161 A. 222, 224 (R.I. 1932).
29. State v. Danahey, 274 A.2d 736, 741 (R.I. 1971).
30. See Fry, 130 A.3d at 831 (“[T]his Court has consistently held that ‘when
such evidence . . . is probative, the trial court’s admission of explicit
photographs is not an abuse of discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal.’”
(quoting State v. Carter, 744 A.2d 839, 847 (R.I. 2000))).
31. 252 A.2d 354, 355 (R.I. 1969).
32. Id.
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assault. 33
The victim’s seven-year-old brother notified police that a
neighbor, who lived just four houses down the street, had been at
the house the night before. 34 That neighbor was brought into police
headquarters, where he admitted to returning to the victim’s home
after midnight and committing the sexual assault and murder.35
At trial, he sought to preclude the admission of crime scene and
autopsy photographs showing the condition of the victim. 36 The
trial court did not agree with him and admitted the photos. 37
The Rhode Island Supreme Court agreed with the trial judge. 38
It recited the various ways in which such photographs possess
probative value:
proof of the corpus delicti, the extent of injury, the
condition and identification of the body or for their bearing
on the question of the degree of atrociousness of the crime,
even though such photographs may tend to have an
influence beyond the strict limits for which they were
introduced. 39
The court then looked at the photos for their prejudicial effect: “We
have examined the photographs in dispute and find them not to be
This
as offensive as they are portrayed by defendant.” 40
examination should be familiar—it presages, without using the
same terms, the analysis called for by Rule 403. The seed of the
change comes after this substantive discussion: “[w]hile this court
will not countenance the use of photographs whose sole purpose is
to inflame a jury, defendant has failed to show us that the use of
the disputed evidence amounted to an abuse of the trial justice’s
discretion.” 41
This statement comes after the discussion on the merits of the
case and is not essential to the court’s holding—it is not
precedential.42 The adoption of this dictum as a new substantive
33. Id.
34. Id. at 356.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 356–57.
42. See Obiter Dictum, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (“A judicial
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rule of law was not long in coming, though. By 1972 the court, in
State v. Pombo, was already applying it as the determinative test,
stating that “[t]he defendant has failed to persuade us that the sole
purpose of offering this photo into evidence was to inflame the
jury[.]” 43 And a definite shift is apparent: in Winston, the court is
saying that it would not accept evidence offered solely to inflame
the jury; in Pombo, the court is saying that it will only exclude
evidence if it is solely offered to inflame the jury. This is the
transformation of a sufficient condition into a necessary one. The
tests were thus settled in their current forms before the creation of
the Rules of Evidence.
THE ADOPTION OF THE RULES OF EVIDENCE

The Rhode Island Rules of Evidence were adopted on October
1, 1987. 44 The General Assembly simultaneously made several
previous statutory provisions dealing with evidence self-repealing
on the date of the adoption of the rules. 45 And it included a new
provision, passed to coincide with the adoption of the rules: “The
rules of evidence as adopted by the Rhode Island supreme court
shall be controlling and take precedence over any statutory or case
law in effect at the time of the adoption that is inconsistent with
the Rhode Island rules of evidence.”46
The two rules for crime scene photographs are plainly
inconsistent with the text of the rule. Rule 403 requires a trial court
to weigh probative value against the potential for unfair
prejudice.47 The case law on crime scene photography evidence
varies substantially from the Rule 403 balancing test in the two
ways described above. The substantive elements accept crime
scene photographs when they are relevant and probative, without
any regard to unfair prejudice; there is no balancing, as the rule
requires. And the intent inquiry has no basis in the text of the rule
comment made while delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary
to the decision in the case and therefore not precedential (although it may be
considered persuasive).”).
43. 290 A.2d 855, 857 (R.I. 1972) (citing Winston, 252 A.2d 354, 354 (R.I.
1969).
44. Order, In re Rhode Island Rules of Evidence, No. 0915e (R.I. July 23,
1987).
45. See id. 9 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-19-16–18, repealed by P.L. 1987, ch. 381,
§ 7; cf. RHODE ISLAND EVIDENCE MANUAL, supra note 10, at xvi n.2.
46. Id. § 9-19-42.
47. R.I. R. EVID. 403.
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at all. Rule 403, by its very terms, assumes that there is a proper
basis for introducing the evidence. That is why it “cuts across” all
other rules of evidence: it applies to evidence that would otherwise
be admissible but still should not be admitted because of
extraordinary circumstances. 48
The case law is inconsistent with the Rule, and a statute
precludes reliance on those two earlier tests. They must, then, give
way to the text of Rule 403. But that has not happened. There do
not appear to be any reported cases analyzing the impact of section
9-19-42 of the Rhode Island General Laws on this evidence doctrine.
In fact, there are few reported decisions that even cite that
statute. 49
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has, though,
recognized the force of section 9-19-42 previously, and used it to
eliminate reliance on inconsistent decisions predating the Rules of
Evidence for expert testimony. 50 It seems evident that reliance on
case law predating—and inconsistent with—the Rules of Evidence
is misplaced.
PUTTING A GLOSS ON THE RULE?

If the Rule is inconsistent with existing case law, prior
decisions must give way to the Rule, and the Rhode Island Supreme
Court has said as much. But can the Rhode Island Supreme Court,
as the font of authority for the Rules of Evidence, diverge from the
text of the Rule on its own initiative, essentially re-adopting former
law by implication?
While the court likely possesses the
constitutional authority to do so, a recent decision suggests that the
court would (and should) refuse to do so.
The Rhode Island Rules of Evidence were not, as noted above,
48. See State v. Gaspar, 982 A.2d 140, 147–48 (R.I. 2009).
49. A search of reported Rhode Island decisions reveals just three Rhode
Island Supreme Court cases addressing the statute: Flanagan v. Wesselhoeft,
712 A.2d 365, 369 (R.I. 1998); Owens v. Payless Cashways, Inc., 670 A.2d 1240,
1243 (R.I. 1996); and Martinez v. Kurdziel, 612 A.2d 669, 673 (R.I. 1992).
50. Flanagan, 712 A.2d at 369.
By virtue of § 9-19-42, Rule 702 took “precedence over any statutory
or case law in effect at the time of its adoption” that was “inconsistent
with the Rhode Island [R]ules of [E]vidence.” Rule 702 effectively has
served to trump Richardson [v. Fuchs, 523 A.2d 445 (R.I. 1987)],
Young [v. Park, 417 A.2d 889 (R.I. 1980)], and Schenck [v. Roger
Williams Gen. Hosp., 382 A.2d 514 (R.I. 1977)], all relied upon by the
trial justice for her exclusion of Dr. Brand’s deposition testimony.
Id.
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promulgated under enabling legislation passed by the General
Assembly. 51 The law governing the Rules of Civil Procedure,
section 8-6-2(a) of the Rhode Island General Laws, grants the power
to amend those rules, but distributes that power across the
courts. 52 The members of each bench may vote on rules of
procedure, and then submit them to the Rhode Island Supreme
Court for final approval.53 No such procedure is required by any
statute for the Rules of Evidence. As the supreme court relied on
the broad supervisory authority it holds by law from the General
Assembly, augmented by the inherent constitutional power it holds
as the state supreme court, there does not appear to be any required
procedure for amending the rules.
If the court desired, it likely could amend the rules on its own
initiative, even by decision. But the court has firmly stated that it
recognizes prudential limits on the exercise of its plenary power,
and specifically will not seek to vary from a plain language
interpretation of a rule. Cashman Equipment Corp., Inc. v. Cardi
Corp., Inc. presents the unenviable scenario where practice norms
diverge from the text of a rule. 54 The dispute centered on work
performed in constructing the Sakonnet River Bridge. The
particular issue before the court was the discoverability of computer
models and draft reports used by the defendant’s expert in the
course of formulating his opinion.55 The trial court denied a motion
to compel discovery, holding that it was constrained in this scenario
by the Rules of Civil Procedure. 56
The plaintiff, the party seeking discovery, offered a
comprehensive argument indicating that general practice saw the
materials sought as discoverable, and that the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure made the material discoverable. 57 The defendant
responded, however, that Rhode Island’s rule varied in its text from
the federal rule; it allowed only for expert discovery via
interrogatories or depositions of the expert themselves—not the
51. Order, In re Rhode Island Rules of Evidence, No. 0915e (R.I. July 23,
1987) (“The rules are promulgated pursuant to the powers conferred upon this
Court by G.L. 1956 (1985 Reenactment) § 8-1-2, and also pursuant to its
constitutional and inherent powers.”).
52. 8 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-6-2(a).
53. Id.
54. 139 A.3d 379 (R.I. 2016).
55. Id. at 380.
56. Id. at 381.
57. Id.
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discovery of underlying documentation.58 Because the language of
the Rule of Civil Procedure was plain and unambiguous, the end
result was inescapable: the material was not discoverable. 59 More
important here, the court acknowledged the basic premise of the
plaintiff’s argument—that the court should read the rule to include
what it was seeking as a practical concession—and rejected it
outright. “To determine otherwise would require this Court to alter
the present rule by judicial fiat, a practice in which we will not
engage.” 60
The court did rest its decision in part upon the amendment
procedure for the Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a vote of
the members of the relevant court, as described above, precluding
the Rhode Island Supreme Court from acting unilaterally.61 But it
nonetheless began its discussion by stating emphatically what it
considers to be prudential limits on the exercise of its powers. The
court’s position on rule changes is sensible and absolute: it will not
do so absent an appropriate process, and it will not decree new rules
on its own accord. 62 We are left here: statutory authority forecloses
judicial reliance on common law doctrine inconsistent with the
Rules of Evidence, and the Rhode Island Supreme Court has a
strong institutional preference against unilateral action to vary the
text of its rules.
JUST THE TEXT

“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.” 63 This is the appropriate test
to apply to an evidentiary challenge under Rule 403. This test does
58. Id. at 382.
59. Id. at 383.
60. Id. (citing Capital Props. Inc. v. City of Providence, 843 A.2d 456, 460
(R.I. 2004)).
61. Id. at 383 (“As Cardi points out, the process for amending the Superior
Court Rules of Civil Procedure is provided by statute.”).
62. In the evidence context, this process would likely repeat the convening
of an advisory committee, which then investigates case law and the impacts of
the rules and then proffers revisions to the Rhode Island Supreme Court for
review and finalization. See RHODE ISLAND EVIDENCE MANUAL, supra note 10,
at xxv-xxvi, xxvii-xxix.
63. R.I. R. EVID. 403.
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not countenance evaluating crime scene photographs only in terms
of relevance and probative value, nor does it turn upon an inquiry
into the intent animating an evidentiary proffer. The other
doctrines cannot lawfully be applied to cases in light of section 919-42, as that statute “effectively [serves] to trump” them. 64
This change will not lead to upheaval in the courts. “It is only
evidence that is marginally relevant and enormously prejudicial
that must be excluded.” 65 No defendant is entitled to a “sanitized
version of the state’s evidence against him.” 66 And trial judges are
well aware that the discretion afforded to them to exclude evidence
under Rule 403 must be exercised sparingly. 67 The proper
application of the Rule 403 balancing test will not disrupt the mine
run of cases, as it should not.
Granted, the stakes, in terms of practical effect, are low. This
will not be a sea change in the law, revolutionizing criminal practice
in the state. But in every case, courts should apply the law as it
exists, and not be contented with uncritically applying the dead
doctrines of the past. What matters is that the test as applied is
not the law. If the legal profession can be said to have any basic
duty, it is the duty to accurately state the law.
Beyond this fundamental concern, the application of these tests
frustrates the intention of the rule. Application of old and
superseded law can, and does, lead to courts resolving Rule 403
challenges on discarded doctrine rather than on the plain text of the
Rules of Evidence. 68 The two collateral doctrines make it all too
easy to elide the rule as written and apply judicial innovations
rather than the text upon which the bench and bar are supposed to
rely. Reliance on these tests distorts outcomes in a way that
64. Flanagan v. Wesselhoeft, 712 A.2d 365, 369 (R.I. 1998).
65. State v. Patel, 949 A.2d 401, 412–13 (R.I. 2008).
66. State v. Pona, 66 A.3d 454, 468 (R.I. 2013).
67. State v. Virola, 115 A.3d 980, 996 (R.I. 2015) (citing State v. Brown, 42
A.3d 1239, 1244 (R.I. 2012)).
68. See, e.g., State v. Garcia, 140 A.3d 133, 144–45 (R.I. 2016) (holding
autopsy photographs admissible under Rule 403 because they are
“‘unquestionably relevant’” without weighing possibility of unfair prejudice);
State v. Fry, 130 A.3d 812, 830 (R.I. 2016) (“[W]e cannot conclude that the video
was offered ‘solely to inflame the passions of the jury[,]’ as would be required
to prevent its admission.” (quoting State v. O’Brien, 774 A.2d 89, 107 (R.I.
2001))); State v. Brown, 88 A.3d 1101, 1121 (R.I. 2014) (“We are unable to
conclude that the trial justice abused his discretion when he ruled that the
state did not present these photographs solely to inflame the passions of the
jury . . . .”).
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diverges from the Rules of Evidence, defeating their purpose. It is
difficult to envision a scenario in which a crime scene photograph
would be irrelevant, or one in which surrounding circumstances
would offer sufficient proof of a prosecutor’s improper intent. It is
not just that the doctrines continue to exist after the adoption of the
Rules of Evidence, it is that they tear the heart out of one of the
most important of them.
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court promulgated its Rules of
Evidence on October 1, 1987.69 Since then, the dead hand of old
law has prevented the Rules from operating as they should. The
bench and bar should take the opportunity to recognize this fact
and challenge the application of this disavowed precedent. If the
extratextual evidence doctrines applied by Rhode Island courts are
to be preserved, they should be formally added to a revised edition
of the Rules of Evidence; rewriting rules by judicial fiat is
something the Rhode Island Supreme Court strenuously refuses to
do. Notwithstanding its aversion to doing so, that revision by fiat
is exactly what has been happening to Rule 403. The proper means
to preserve these doctrines is to convene an advisory committee to
recommend rule revisions to the Supreme Court. But until and
unless that happens, the Rules of Evidence must mean exactly what
they say, and no more or less.

69. Order, In re Rhode Island Rules of Evidence, No. 0915e (R.I. July 23,
1987).

